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IN THE .SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

c·ase No. 8684

BARTON KAY KIRKHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
/The defendant and appellant will be referred to as
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will he referred
to as the State. .All italics are ours.
The complaint charging defendant with the crime of
murder in the first degree was filed on August 13, 1956.
The preliminary hearing was held on August 22, 1956
and defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
(R. 2, 3). In the District Court defendant ·entered a plea
of not auilty by reason of insanity (R. 50). The case
was tried before the Honorable Martin M. L.ar.son, Judge,
commencing on the 12th day of December, A.D. 1956 and
at the conclusion of the case, after two and one-half
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hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree without recommending leniency (R. 267). Thereafter, an appeal was perfected to this Court (R. 275, 276).
THE FACTS
The facts p~ertaining to the killing of David Avon
Frame are largely undisputed. Briefly, they reveal that
on the night of August 11, 1956, at approximately
11:30 P.M. the defendant Barton Kay Kirkham entered
a grocery store known as Nibley Park :Market located
on the north east corner of 27th South and 5th East
Street in Salt Lake County, LTtah, and while in the commission of an armed robbery required David Avon Frame
and Ruth Holmes \\. .ebster to lay face downward on the
floor in the back of the store and shot and killed them
(R. 60, 61). Events of the evening leading up to the
robbery and killing were as follows: The defendant had
met a friend Sterle Pierce, in the lobby of the Hotel
Utah where Pierce worked. Defendant \Yas \Yearing certain clothing \Yhich he had \Yorn in a robbery at Pueblo,
Colorado. He had previously informed Pierce he would
wear said clothing again if he ever perforn1ed another
holdup (R. 33). After leanng the l1otel, defendant drove
ai1nlessly around to,Yn and at approxiinately 11 o'clock
P.l\f. encountered a group of young n1en in another autoInobile. He followed the auto1nobile for som·e distance
until the young 1nen pulled over to the curb and stopped.
DefPndant droYe up alongside and said ''You fellows
looking for a bP~ef~" He l1ad a gun in his hand (R. 47).
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One of the boys asked him if the gun was loaded and in
response he ejected a shell (R. 47). One of the young men
testified that he "made us nervous and wonde-red about
him" and, "Well, his words were quite - well, not right;
I'll put it that way; for the circumstances, it didn't se·em
right" (R. 52, 57). As defendant was driving ,away
the boys took his license number and reported the incident to the Police (R. 52).
Following the robbery and killing, as defendant was
driving away he inadvertently shot a hole in his windshield. Thereafter he abandoned the automobile ,and
next appeared shortly .after midnight at the home of a
Mrs. Bonnie Christean. H·e brandished the gun in he-r
face and told her that he had just shot two people (R. 91,
92). He asked if Mrs. Christean had an automobile.
She informed him her son, Arthur, had an automobile
and would r·eturn home shortly (R. 92). Before the son
arrived her daughter, Shawna, came home from a date.
He required Mrs. Christean and Shawna to remain in his
presence until Arthur arrived (R. 95). During the waiting period he told the Christ'ean.s that he had been an
inmate of a Colorado prison (R. 95). When the son
arrived, defendant ordered the son and daughter to get
in the automobile. He told Mrs. ·Christean he would kill
them both if she called the police. The Christeans a.t no
time crossed defendant or offered any resistance to his
instructions (R. 98, 105). Arthur drove the automobile
and Shawna rode in the front seat while defendant rode
in the hack seat with hi.s gun pointed at their heads.
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Arthur talked quietly to him as they proceeded south
toward Provo, Utah. At one point defendant stopped
and purchased five dollars worth of gas. Defendant
had Arthur turn the radio on and commented "that they
didn't have the guts to put it on the radio." He also said
he had killed two people, that "the woman had been hysterical and the man had tried to play hero" (R. 104).
Eventually, defendant directed Arthur from the main
highway up Provo canyon for a distance where he
ordered Arthur to stop and get out of the automobile
and start walking. Arthur obeyed. He fired a shot over
Arthur's head and told Shawna "That is just to show you
I am not fooling around" (R. 106). Defendant then
orde-red Shawna to drive the automobile. She wa.s alone
with the defendant for approximately an hour and a half
(R. 106). During this time she did not attempt to argue
or remonstrate with the defendant about anything but
was submissive to him (R. 112). A short time thereafter,
defendant and Shawna drove out of the canyon and
defendant voluntarily gave himself up to the police.
Deputy Sheriff Re·ed L. Rigtrup, who brought the defendant to Salt I~ake, testified that defendant said he
did it for an anniYersary celebration "~hich should have
happened a 'veek later, but "tltat things came up suitable
for it and I did the job that night." Officer Hunsaker
testified that at no tilne did defendant sho'v any remorse
or sha1nP, that he ahnost enjoyed telling the story (R.
139). His fathPr testified that at the city jail .after the
shooting, deft•ndant de1nonstrated no remorse or feeling
of guilt or sorro'v (R. 180).
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While incarcerated at the Salt Lake C'Ounty jail
awaiting trial, at the instance of the Court, defendant
was given a psychiatric examination by Dr. 'Clarence
Craig Nelson, a licensed medical doctor and psychiatrist.
The examination wa.s made jointly with Dr. Gordon
Johnson who did not testify (R. 148). Dr. Nelson testified that mental and emotional disorders fall into four
groups, first, psychotic reactions; second, charaeter disorders; third, psyclrosom·atic disorders; fourth, psychoneurotic di.sorders (R. 142). He testified that when any
one of the four above-mentioned types of disorders are
of a serious nature, such condition can be re.adily determined by a psychiatric examination (R. 143). He further testified that character disorders ordinarily develop
in childhood and that when such disorder is of a severe
type, the individual suffering therefrom will feel no remorse or guilt over things that he does (R. 147). This
condition is termed an emotional or mental illness. In
this conneCition he testified "Q. Would you speak of a
severe character disorder as a mental illness~ A. Yes."
Dr. Nelson e·mphasized the fact that defendant "demonstrated no remor.se" in describing the crime and that his
comment was that he "w.asn't going to risk his neck over
such a paltry sum" (R. 149).
H·e stated that defendant was suffering from a
mental illness consisting of a char:acter disorder of the
severest type (R. 150). He testified that there are forms
of treatment recognized for this condition and that without treatment said condition would never change except

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

for the worse (R. 150, 151, 156). Dr. Nelson ·also testified
th~t

con.sidering the type of character disorder and

mental illness defendant was suffering from, he would
.

not expect defendant to have a feeling of

sha-n,e
g

:

or re-

morse over commission of the crime (R. 158). He testified
that a person suffering from this type of mental illness,
when an obstacle is placed in his path, will usually respond with some anti-social reaction (R. 158). On redirect
examination the following questions were asked:

"Q. Now, counsel has also asked you some questions concerning the patient's ability to distingui~h or to determine right from wrong;
I will ask you whether that ability, in view of
his lack of conscience - lack of remorse - is
the ability which the normal person possesses.
A.

From strictly a thinking point of view, the
ability would have to be thought of as the
same. It would be done on the basis of his
kno,Y1edge of right or \vrong, and not on the
basi.s of a conscience or auto1natic control.

Q.

Fro1n the point of vie"T of his O\Yn justification within hlmself of his own actions, what
would you say~
*

A.

* *

Well, he would feel that he \vas- though he
kne\v this \vas wrong- he u·ould feel, under
his U'ay of viewi·ng it, it 1cas justified, in 1ny
opiu·£on" (R. 168, 169).
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There was an abundance of lay testimony to substantiate Dr. Nelson'.s diagnosis of mental illness. Barton Kay Kirkham was the oldest child in a family of five
(R. 171). As a very young child he displayed a lack of
:emotion. His father testified that when he was 6 or 7
he would not cry vvhen he was sp.anked (R. 172'). His
mother testifie,d that as a child defendant had no remorse
or feeling of guilt about anything. He undertook school
les.sons with the utmost reluctance and frequently
sluffed. "He just couldn't stand ito have people talk to
him and tell him what to do" (R. 172). When he quit
high school, the excuse he gave his f:ather was that he
couldn't s~tand th·e "yakkety yak" (R. 173). He tried several different jobs and also spent a short time in avocational school with mediocre succes.s (R. 173). Thereafter,
he enlisted in the Army Air Corps, first undergoing basic
training at San Antonio, Texas, and then being assigned
to the Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho (R. 174). While
at Mountain Home he was given a temporary assignment to England. In England he met a girl. After
returning to Mountain Home he .asked his fruther and
mothe~r to make arrangements to bring the girl to the
United State.s. They put him off and this caused him to~o
AWOL (R. 175, 186). He proceeded by bus to Pueblo,
Colorado, and purchased a gun from a pawn shop
and stole an automobile at gunpoint. He was almost
immediately apprehended and sp·ent a number of months
at the Buena Vista, Color~ado, reformatory. This was his
only criminal record prior to the offense here involved.
His parents visited him at the reformatory. He h:ad abso-
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lutely no remor.s-e or shame for his conduct (R. 175). Following his release from Buena Vista on probation, and
a dishonorable discharge from the Army, he returned to
Salt Lake City to live with his parents (R. 177). He
arriv·ed June 1, 1956. From that date until August 11,
1956, the· date of the robbery and killing, a number of
abnormalities were noticed by his parents. He was highly

agitated and ·easily excited. He would go to extremes in
his voice, sometimes shouting tremendously at the other
children (R. 177). On occasions he would come up behind
one of the children, grab the child and give "a tremendous
shout, scaring everybody" (R. 177). There was no humor
attached to this conduct. He was suffering from a severe
ab.scess on the end of the spine which caused him constant
irritrution and pain (R. 177). In addition, he was suffering from a number of cavities in his teeth (R. 178).
His mother observed that he wasn't adjusting to
home life and discussed the need for psychiatric care
with the family doctor, Stanley X eff, who was taking
care of the cyst on defendant's spine (R. 189).
A short time prior to the robbery and killing, defendant
had 1net a S.alt Lake girl and after going "ith her for a
period of time had told her about Iris criminal record.
Thereafter, she refused to have anything to do ''ith hint
and this disa ppointntent caused hun to beco1ne very
morose and restless (R. 191, 192).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE 'TRIAL ·CO·URT CO·MMITTED REVERSIBLE E.RROR
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHEREIN IT ADVISED 'THE
JURY THAT THE TEST OF INSANITY WAS WHETHER
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW HIS ACT WA'S WR.O:NG
IN THE SENSE THAT SUCH ACT WAS CONDEMNED BY
MORALS OR LAW.
POINT II
THE TRIAL CO,UR.T COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERR:OR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INS'TRUCTIO·N NO. 3.

ARGUMENT
P.OIN'T I
THE TRIAL COURT CO~MMITTED REVERSIBLE ER.R.OR
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHEREIN IT ADVISED THE
JURY THAT THE TEST OF INSANITY WAS WHE·THER
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW HIS ACT W ~S WRONG IN
THE SENSE THAT SUCH ACT WAS ~CONDEMNED BY
MORALS OR LAW.

A portion of Instru0tion No. 9 reads as followS!:
Instruction No. 9
"Insanity i.s an element in determining questions of guilt of, or punishment for crime only
when it renders the person so .affected irresponsible or partly irresponsible, that is the defendant
cannot be convicted of a crime, if, .rut the time
of the a0t he was insane to such an extent that he
did not know the nature of the act; that is did not
know he had a revolver, th:at it may he loaded or
that, if discharged, it may injure or kill; or that
when he fired the shot, he did not know it was
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wrong, in the sense that such act was condemned
by morals or law; or that he was unable, by reason
of mental disease, to control his actions or impulses to injure or kill David Avon Frame."
Couns:el for defendant took exception to the foregoing portion of Instruction No. 9 and called attention
to the error ·contained therein where he stated a.s follows
at Record 240: "The foregoing quoted partion of the
instruction carries with it the implication that, if defendant was aware of the definition of murder, and of the
fact that there was a law against murder and robbery,
* * * he could not be insane, even though, although knowing the definitions of those offens:es and the fact that
there were laws against them, within his own mind, he
was convinced that the acts he was performing were
ju_stified and proper.
It is our position that, if he felt the acts were
justified and proper, and l1ad no remorse for them, then,
by necessary implication, he would not have sufficient
kno,vledge of the rightness or 'vrongness of his actions
to be legally sane."
"\Vhere the trial court used tl1e tern1 '·in the sen;;e
that such act 'vas conden1ned by n1ora2s or la"~: •it clearly
instructed the jury that eYen though defendant's sense of
1uorals "~as so perverted and distorted that l1e felt justified in doing the art. "~hich he did and l1ad no remorse
for doing said aet, nevertheles.s if he had sufficient
intellect to kno'v that the law forbid said act, he 'vas
legally sane. That such instruction is incorr~t as an
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abstract proposition of law will be cle1arly p~ointed out
by the authorities hereinafter cited. That Baid error
was prejudicial to the defendant becomes cle:ar when
viewed in the light of the fact1s.
An eighteen year old boy in commission of an armed
robbery lays two pe.ople on the floor and shoots them. He
harbors no ill will against them. In fact, he has never seen
them before. No real or apparent necessity of self defense requires the killing. No motive for th:e roberry
exists except that the :vobbery is an anniversary celebration for a similar rash and nonsensical act that occurred
a year before, and n~o motive for the killing i~s suggested
except his statement to Dr. Nelson that he wasn't going
to risk his neck over such a paltry sum. Yet Dr. N e~lson
testified that defendant felt p~erfectly justified within
hilnself in committing the killings and that in his opinion
defendant genuinely experienced no remorse for his
action (R. 168, 169). The te.stimony of the police officers
and defendant's parents substantiated the fact that defendant was so utterly incapable of understanding the
moral implications of his conduct that he suffered no
remorse or conscience whatsoever. The trial court removed this whole body of both medical and l a;y testimony
from the consideration of the jury where it in.structed in
effect that the sole and only requirement of legal s~anity
was that defendant have sufficient me~nt.ality to know
that his act was a:~ainst the law.
1

The origin of the right and wrong test for determining legal sanity is the old M'Naghten's Case, (1843),
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10 Clark & F, 200. A part of the M'Naghten opm1on
ap·plicable here reads as follows:

"Lord Chief J u_stice Tindal in his charge:
'The question to be determined is, whether at the
time the act in question was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of his understanding,
so as to know that he was doing a wrong or wicked
act. If the jurors should be of opinion that the
prisoner was not sen.sible, at the time he committed it, that he was violating the laws both of God
and man, then he would be entitled to a verdict in
·his favor; but if, on the contrary, they were of
opinion that when he committed the act he was
in a sound state of mind, th-en their verdict must
be against him.'"
A most scholarly discussion of M'Naghten'.s rule and
the necessity of moral responsibility in application of
the right and wrong test is to be found in the case of
People vs. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 K.E. 945 (decided
November 23, 1915). In the Schmidt case defendant was
accused of killing a woman ·and dismembering her body.
He confes.sed to th:e killing but entered a plea of not
guilty by re1ason of insanity. He told the pl1ysicians who
examined him that he had l1eard the \oice of God calling
upon him to kill the won1an as a sacrifice and atonement
and that he had co1nmitted the killing in the Yisible presence of God. The jury found lill11 guilty of n1urder in
the first degre e. Therea.fter, in a n1otion for new trial,
his counsel filed Iris affidaYit stating that his story pertaining to heavenly visitations '\Yas a shan1, that the
'vonu1n had actually died fron1 a criininal operation, tl1at
1
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her body had been dismembered and he had told a falS;e
story in order to conceal the illegal operation. The court,
speaking through l\1r. Justice Cardozo, found that certain instructions pertaining to the test of legal insanity
were error but that in view of th:e fact that defendant
had now conceded that the defense of insanity was without merit, defendant was in no position to complain of
the error on appeal. Jus!tiC'e ~Cordozo stated:
"The learned trial judge said to the jury that
'wrong' in this definition means 'con!trary to the·
law of the state.' The jury w.as instructed in
pointed and impressive terms, that even if the defendant believed in good faith that God had appeared to him and commanded the sacrifice of
Anna Aamuller, and this belief was a delusion, the
result of .a defect of reason, the defendant must
none the less answer to the law if he knew the
nature and quality of the act, and knew that it was
wrong, in the sense that it was forbidden by the
law of the state."
* * *

"We are unable to accept tire view that the
word 'wrong' in the statutory definition is to receive so narrow a construction."
Justice Cordozo then outlined the history of the
right and wrong test. In discussing the M'Naghten case,
he stated:
"The definition here propounded is the one
that has been carried forward into our statute.
The judges expressly held that a defendant who
knew nothing of the law would none the less be
responsible if he· knew that the act was wrong, by
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which, therefore, they must have meant, if he
knew that it wa.s morally wrong. Whether he
would also he responsible if he knew that it was
against the law, but did not know it to he morally
wrong, is a question that was not considered.
In most cases, of course, knowledge that an act is
illegal will justify the inference of knowledge that
it is wrong. But none the less it is the knowledge
of wrong, conceived of as moral wrong, that seems
to have been established by that decision as the
controlling test. That must certainly have been
the test under the older law when the capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong imported a
capacity to distinguish hetween good and evil as
ab.stract qualities. There is nothing to justify the
belief that the words 'right and wrong,' when they
became limited by M'Kaghten's Case to the right
and wrong of the particular act, cast off their
meaning as terms of morals, and became terms of
pure legality."
The court continues:
"We have still another guide to help us to
a sound construction of ~I'Kaughten's Case and
of the statutorv rule deriYed from it. That guide
is found in th~ practice of judge.s by 'vhom the
decision has been applied. -nTe refer to a few
instances ~nnong n1any. In Reg. Y. Townley, 3
Fost. &, F. 839~ ~fartin~ B., left it to the jury
to say "\Yhether the prisoner lme'Y that the act ,,~as
'contrary to the la"~ of God and punishable by
the la"T of the land.' In Reg. Y. Layton, 4 Cox,
C.C. 149, R.o}f(\ B., said that the jury n1nst deterlnine "Thether the prisoner~s delusion 'had the
effect of HUlking hi1n incapable of understanding
the wj e.kt'dness of n1urdering his 'Yife. · See also
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Reg. v. Law, 2 Fost. & F. 836. In many cases,
both in our own courts and in those of sisrter
states, the language of Lord Mansfield in Bellingham's C.ase, 27 How. St. Tr. 636, is adopted with
trifling changes, and the t~est is said to be whether
the defendant understood that the act was forbidden 'by the 1aws of God and man.' People
v. Waltz, 50 How. Pr. 204, 232; People v. Pine,
2 Barb. 566, 570; Casey v. People, 31 Hun, 158,
161. In Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 41 Am. Dec.
458, Shaw, Ch. J., in expounding the rule, as·sumed for illustration an ins.ane delusion that
God had commanded a crime. He told the jury
that a defendant, to be responsible, 'must have
.sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which
others stand to him; that the act he is doing is
contrary to the plain dictates of justice ,and right,
injurious to orthers, and a violation of the dict ateH
of duty;' and then, to explain the delusions that
will relieve a man from criminal liability, he
said: 'A common instance is where he fully believe.s that the act he. is doing is done by the
immediate command of God, and he acts under
the delusive but sincere belief that what he is
doing is by the command of a superior power,
which supersedes all human laws and the laws
of nature.'"
1

"In Guiteau's ,C;ase (D.C.) 10 Fed. 161, these
words were quoted approvingly, and supplemented by other illustrations. The court. instanced the case of a man known to be an affectionate father, who 'insists that the Almighty
has appeared to him and commanded him to
sacrifice his child.' Of these and like cas,es, the
court said ( p. 182) : 'If a m'an insanely believes
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that he has a command from the .Almighty to
kill, it is difficult to unde.r~tand how such a man
can know that it is wrong for him to do it.'
" 'Such a man is no less insane because he
knows that murder is prohibited by human law.
Indeed, it may emphasize his insanity that,
knowing the human law, he believes that he .is
acting under the direct command of God.'
"'Cases may be found where, in explaining
what is meant by knowledge that an act is wrong
the courts have blended the elements of legal and
moral wrong, but none, we believe, can be found
in which the element of moral wrong has been
excluded * * *'
"To the reported cases in which the word
'wrong' in the statutory definition has been used
as importing a moral wrong, there may be added
a multitude of unreported cases. As an illustration we may refer to a case recently decided by
this court. People v. Purcell, 214 N.Y. 693, 109
N.E. 1087. There the trial judge (Nott, J.) in a
careful and able charge told the ju,ry that knowledge of the nature and quality of the act has
reference to its physical nature and quality, and
that knowledge that it is zcron.g refers to its
moral side: that to know that the act is wrong,
the defendant must know that it is 'contrary
to law, and contrary to the accepted standards
of morality,' and then he added~ 1cith a slight
variation of the u'ords of Lord Mansfield, tlzat
it must be known to be 'contrary to the Tau's of
God and man.'
''In the light of ·all these preeedents, it is
impo~ssible, we think, to say that there is any
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decisive adjudication which limits the word
'wrong' in the statutory definition to legal as
oppos-ed to moral wrong. The trend of the decisions is indeed the other way. The utmost that
can be said is that the question is still an open
one. We must, therefore, give that construction to
the st'atute which seem.s to us most consonant
with reruson and justice. T·he definition of insanity established by the statute as sufficient
to relieve from criminal liability has been often
and harshly criticised. See e.g., State v. Pike,
49 N.H. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533; State v. Jones,
50 N.H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242; Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193, 2 So. 854, 7 Am.
Crim. Rep. 266. Some .states re·je.ct it altogethe·r.
P·arsons v. State, supra, and cases there cited.
A recent case in Massachusetts (Com. v. Cooper,
219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N.E. 545) says that an offender
is not responsible if he was 'so mentally dise~ased
that he felt impelled to act by a power which
overcame his re.ason and judgment, and which
to him w3.;s irresistible.' That is not the test with
us. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 11 Am.
Rep. 731; People v. Taylor, 138 N.Y. 398, 34
N.E. 275; Penal Law, para. 34. Whatever the
views of alienists and jurists may be, the te.st in
this state is prescribed by statute, and there can
be no other. People v. Silverman, 181 N.Y. 235,
240, 73 N.E. 980. We must not, however., exaggerate the rigor of the rule by giving the word
'wrong' a strained interpretation, at war with
its broad and primary meaning, ,and least of all,
if in so doing we rob the rule of all relation
to the mental he~alth and true capacity of the
criminal. The interpretation p~laced upon the
statute by the trial judge may he tested by its
consequences. A mother kills her inf.ant child to
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whom she has been devotedly attached. She
knows the nature ·and quality of the act; she
knows that the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion that God has appeared to her and ordained the sa.crifice. It seems
a mockery to say that, within the meaning of
the statute, she knows that the act is wrong. If
the definition propounded by the trial judge is
right, it would be the duty of a jury to hold her
responsible for the crime. We find nothing either
in the history of the rule, or in its reason and
purpose, or in judicial exposition of i'ts meaning,
to justify- ·a conclusion so abhorrent. No jury
would be likely to find a defendant re:sponsible
in such a case, whatever a judge might tell them.
But we cannot bring ourselves to believe that in
declining to yield to such a construction of the
statute, they would violate the law."

"'We hold, therefore, that there are times
and circurnstances in which the word 'wrong' as
used in the statutory test of responsibility ought
not to be limited to .legal wrong."

* * * * * * * *
The r:a:se of a 1nother killing her infant child,
hypoth·e:sized in a slightly different n1anner by Justice
Cardozo in the Sehn1idt Case~ beca1ne a reality in People
vs. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 4:27~ 3 ~.E. (~d) 581 (decided
July 8, 1936). In the Sher,rood ease a n1other, after
suffering a s·eries of adversities, dro,vned her infant
child. She ea.rried the dead child to police headquarters.
In ,ans'\vPr to questioning as to "~11~~ she killed the child
she stHte·d: HI couldn't take ea1~e of hin1 any longer
·and I thought he '\Yonld be be~tter off de~1d.'' ..A..t no
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time was there any show of emotion on her part. At
no time was there any .sign of regret. The defense of
criminal insanity was interposed in the case. The court
held that the trial court committed error by imposing
the requirement not only that defendant did not know
the nature and quality of the act committed but also
that she did not know said act was wrong. The court
stated:
"In the main charge it was not made clear
that a defe·ct of reason which inhibited a knowledge either of the nature and quality of the act
or that the act was wrong excused a person
from criminal liability. At various points the two
matters were referred to in the conjunctive, with
the word 'and' instead of the word 'or'. The
error was called to the: attention of the court
at the close of the main charge, and the court
said merely: 'If I made that error, I so charge.'
Left in that w;ay, the distinction might doubtfully he considered as having been made clear.
But thereafter-and it was the court's last word
before the jury retired-the court upon request
charged that a mere false belief would not be
sufficient to excus·e her, 'unless it was the re.sult
of some mental disease which prevented her fro1n
knowing the n.ature and quality of the act and
that it was wrongful.' Here was a rep~etition of
the same error, complicated with a reference to
'some men'tal disease,' i.e., some pathological eonclition, :instead of a 'defect reason,' as the
statute reads. No disease, no pathological condition, existed or was claimed to exist. It may be
doubted whether the jury had a clear conception of when ,a person is or is not criminally liable
under section 1120."
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In the case at bar the jury w.as bound to find that
"from strictly a thinking point of view" defendant was
capable of understanding th~at the law forbid murder
(R. 168, 169). However, the evidence would also support
a finding that defendant was incapable of understanding
the moral implications of the offense. In this connection
we call attention to the language in the case of People
vs. Purcell, 214 N.Y. 693, 109 N.E. 1087, cited in the
Schmidt case, _supra, where it is pointed out that the
nature and quality of the act test has reference to its
physical nature and quality .and that knowledge of wrong
test refers to its moral side; that to know the act is
wrong the defendant must know that it is contrary to
law, and contrary to the accepted standards of morality.
Here the trial court has eliminated entirely the morality
concept. The jury is told in effect that if defendant
knew that hi_s acts were against the law he is legally
sane. This is accomplished sin1ply by use of the conjunctive or rather than the conjuncti\e and. But this
error, as it did in the Sheru,ood Case_, supra, eliminated
all moral considerations from the right and ''~ong test
and left solely the I.Q. test of "~hether defendant was
well enough ori~ented to understand tl1at there was a
law .against murder.
In /( earucy Y8. State, 68 ~fiss. 233~ S So. 292~ an
instruction that the defendant "~as responsible for his
.aet if the jury beliPYl'd at tl1e ti1ne of the killing that
"th0 n1ind of the defendant "~as capable of knowing
that if he shot the dece:a.sed not in his o'v11 self-defense,
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he was committing an offense against the law of the
1and, and it will not matter what the jury believes w:as
rthe moral conception of the defendant of the act at
the time," vV1as held to he such a departure from the
right and wr.ong test as to be reversible.
Although we have discovered no Utah case specifically di.scus~sing the subject we believe that Utah adheres
to the morality concept in application of the right and
wrong test of sanity.
In State vs. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641, defendant w;rus accused of forgery. His defense was ins:anity. This court reversed -a conviction and as a matter
of law held that the defense of insanity had belen erstablished. The fact.s of the case reveal .a rem·arkable similarity in mental condition between Brown and the defendant here.
"In detailing his conduci at the time of, and
after, his ar.rest all the witnesses s.ay that he
did not seem to realize that he had done anything wrong; that he would insist in all apparent
sincerity that he had done nothing wrong or to
be ashamed of, and that his friends and family
ought to be proud of him. It is further shown
that after his arrest, and before his trial, and
even :after having been convicted, he insisted that
there was nothing to the whole matter; that he
'(presumably meaning the officers) had them on
the run,' or that he 'had them under hi.s thumb.'
After his conviction he said that he 'had th~e~m
now where h~e wanted them; that they would now
have to come to him.' It was also made to appear
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th:at during the first and the l:ast trial h-e did
not seem to eare anything about the matter ; that
he was wholly indifferent with respect to the result of the case, and when the jury found him
guilty, he apparently was oblivious to what had
occurred, ~and that he was in no way concerned."
The court then discusses the test of insanity as
follows:
1

"But if we assume that defendant intended
'to forge the checks, which he no doubt did, this
is not alone sufficient to make an insane person
guilty of a crime. As \Vas well said by nfr. Justice
Sullivan, Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 228, 78 N.W.
509, 76 Am. St. Rep. 80: 'Such is not the law
* * * Ordinarily insane persons comprehend the
nature of their acts. \Vhen they take life or
destroy p,roperty, they usually know what they
are doing, and often choose means _singularly
fitted to accomplish the end in ne\Y.' The true
test is whether the defendant, at the tinze of the
commission of the offense~ had the nzental capacity to know that in doing the act he u·as doing
wrong. As w.as said in Haw v. State, 11 Neb.
537, 10 N.\,T. 452, 38 .L~n1. Rep. 375: '.A. nd "~here
an individual lacks the n1ental capac.it~~ to distinguish right fron1 "~ron g. in reference to the particulnr act con1plained of, tl1e law will not hold
him responsible'."
In State YS. Green (decided February 9, 1935) 40
P. 2d 961, 1~ehenring denied . A. pril 6, 1935, 86 L_Ttah 192,
it i.s intr•rt'sting to note that eYen though defendant
requested nn instrur:tion eontaining the "~ords Hhe did
not kno"r it "~:n~ "~rong in the sense that s.uch act. \Ya.s
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condemned by morals or law" the trial judge changed
the language and submitted the case to th~ jury containing the words "he did not know it was wrong in
·the sense that such an act w.a,s condemned by morals
and law.''
See al.so State vs. Hadley, (Utah 1925) 234 Pac.
940, where the test is said to be whether defendant
was "in such a mental state a:s to deprive him of the
capacity to understand that the act committed constituted an offense and was wrong."
It is interesting to not e that Instruction No. 9, of
which we here complain, includes the words "condemned
by morals" but d·eprive:s them of their meaning by use
of the conjunctive "or." So even here we have an implied
recognition of the m·orality requirement in application
of the right .and wrong test.
1

We submit that in the great majority of cases discussing the right and wrong test the distinction between
knowledge of the immorality of the act and knowledge
of the illegality of the act is not discussed. Justice
Cardozo's p•e·rsuasive opinion in the Schmidt Case, supra,
remains as the leading authority on the subject. Numerous courts, inferentially at least, are lined up with the
Schmidt case, by the manner in whieh they state the
right and wrong test. For example, see the following:
McAllister vs. State 17 Ala., 434, 52 Am. Dec. 180;
Bosell vs. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20: "against
the laws of God and his country"; Blackburn vs. State,
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23 Ohio St. 146: "ag.ainst the laws of God and man."
State vs. Branto 33 Or. 533, 56 Pac. 268 "wrong and
unlawful"; State vs. Brumfield, 104 Or. 506, 209 P. 120,
"wrong and unl~awful"; Com. vs. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573,
72 Atl. 893, "wrong and criminal"; Adair vs. State, 6
Old. Cr. 284, 118 Pac. 416, "-competent to distinguish
between right and wrong, or to understand the nature
of the ;act he was committing."
The modern trend of thought concerning the roll
of moral understanding in application of the right and
wrong test is clearly set forth in an annotation entitled
"Modern Status of the M'Naghten "right and wrong"
test of Criminal Responsibility" appearing -at 45 ALR
(2) 1447, 1450 where the editor states:
"It seems clear, however, in the light of current medical and psychiatric information, that
the ability to "know" right from wrong should
no longer be presented to jury or witness in the
exclusively intellectual sense in which that word
has ordinarily been used in the application of
the rule in the p.ast, but that tlze test should be
the accused's abilit !J to enzotiouaUy and intellectually realize and appreciate. as an integrated personality, th c nature a ud consequences of the moral
choice presented, and that the n1ere ability to
verbalize a correct ans,rer to questions about the
distinction should not be aecepted a.s conclusive
on the issue of crin1inal responsibility. And, by
the san1e token, the tendency· of son1e of the courts
to hold opinion testilnony on the question to the
narrow issue of strictly intellectual capacity
should be corrected, and experts should be per-
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mitted to make freely available to court and jury
the benefit of their technical information upon
the is:sue.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ~COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN REFUSING TO' GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.

Anticipruting the district attorney might claim that
a verdict of not guilty would result in defendant being
turned loose, defense counsel made the following request:
Requested Instruction No. 3
"The State of Utah has ~a mental hospital
where patients who are suffering from mental
illness may be incarcerated ,and treated for such
time as is considered by a court of ·Competent
jurisdiction to be necessary." (R. 266)
The District Attorney did in fact state in his opening argument to the jury: "Should you acquit him,
he would be turned loose'' (R. 204). Again in his rebuttle
argument Mr. Anderson belabored at great length the
proposition that defendant would be turned loose if found
not guilty by rea.son of insanity (R. 231, 232).
The District Attorney's statement was made not as
an opinion, but as a statement of the law governing
the case. It was not founded on ·any evidence introduced
by either party. Neither was it founded on any instruction of the court. Furthermore, it was incorrect and
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m~sle.ading

for two obvious re~asons. First, it carries
the implication tluat the court would have no further
jurisdiction over defendant after a not guilty verdict,
and second that a not guilty verdict would result in
defe·ndant's freedom. With reg~ard to the first inaccuracy
we call attention to the procedure for determining
whether an individual should be subjected to involuntary
hospitalization in a mental institution as set forth at
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 64-7-36 (Sub-section G):
"If, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the court f:inds that the
p·roposed patient (1) is mentally ill, and (2) he·cause of his illne.ss is likely to injure himself
or others if allowed to remain at liberty * * *
it shall order his hospitalization for an inde'terrninate period or for a temporary observational
period not exceeding six months ; otherwise, it
shall dismiss the proceedings."
Fro1n the foregoing statute it is clear. that the
District Court has jurisdiction to determine "'\Yhet.her a
mentally ill person is likely to injure hin1self or others
and may upon a proper sho"-ing:~ order that a person
be incarcerated in the state 1nental hospital for .an indeternlinate period "~hieh 1nay be for life... It is our
belief that juries haYe great faith in our judicial syste1u.
If this jury had kno"'\Yn of the existen{~e of the foregoing
court procedure in detern1ining "'\Yhether an indiYidual
should hP ]neareerated in the state 1nental ho.spit.al they
would have hnd utn1ost eonfidenee that defendant would
not have bePn turned loose by the court. They "~ould
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have realized thwt the court could, and unquestionably
would have protected soci ety against such an eventuality.
This brings us to the second inaccuracy of the District
Attorney's strutement. We are confident that the District
Court would not have turned defendant loose on a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Nelson's
testimony regarding the severe mental illness from which
defendant is suffering and his inability to refrain from
anti-social behavior should set the mrutter forever at
rest. In this connection we also call attention to a number
of cases holding that a court in determining whether
one charged with insanity is likely to injure himself
or others may consider the history of that individual
including any homicide he has committed.
1

See in this connection Orencia vs. Overholsen (District of Columbia 1947) 163 F. (2) 763, where it is held
that where insanity has been responsible for murder,
evidence must be such as to make the court reasonably
certain that the p.atient has been restored to mental
health before discharge \vill be justified. See also Barry
vs. White 64 F. (2) 707; People Ex Rel Thaw vs. Lamb,
118 NYS 389; in re Ostatter 103 Kan. 487, 175 Pac.
377; in re Palmer 26 R.I. 486, 59 Atl. 746.
Nevertheless the jury was here led to believe that
no further proceeding would be had in the event of a
not guilty verdict, and that in the event of a not guilty
verdict defendant would be turned loose.
The cases uniformly hold that it is error for a
prosecuting attorney to misst1ate the law of the c.ase
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in his argument. See State vs. O'Keefe, 23 Nev. 127, 43
P~ac. 918. It is also error for a p·rosecuting attorney to
miss:tate the facts. See State vs. Martinez (Utah 1920)
191 Pac. 214 where the di.strict attorney stated in his
argument that defendant had .admitted he fired the
shot that killed decedent and the record revealed that
the defendant had never made such an admission. Likewise, it is error for a p·rosecuting attorney to appeal to
the passion or prejudice of the jury regarding extraneous
matters.. See Robinson vs. U. S. (CCAS) 32 F (2) 505
where in a prosecution of a government prohibition
agent for accepting a bribe, the court held that it was
reversible error for the prosecuting attorney to state
that a failure to convict would impair the efficiency
of agents employed in the government service and
would result in irreparable injury to the public. In
Bunell vs. State (Tex.) 138 S.W. 707, the court held
that it was reversible err.or for the trial court to refuse
to instruct the jury ·to disregard statements of the prosecuting attorney in his argument that if the jury did
not convict they Inight as well "ipe the local option
law off the statute book and tear do\\--n the courthouse.
In Oakley vs. State (Tex. 1934) 68 S.\\T. (2) 204 an
argument by the prosecution containing a misstatement
somewltat similar to that in the case at bar 'yas held
to be reversible error.
'•It is con·t.ended by the appellant, and we
think correctly so, that this argument """as a
dirPct ap·peal to religious prejudice and calculated
to arouse the e1notions and disregard the charge
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of the court and the testimony ~authorizing .an
acquittal :even if he was insane at the time of
. the commission of the offense. The argument
was ·an :appeal to the jury to convict him of
murder because, if they acquitted him and turned
him loose, a ju:cy in the county court may find
him .sane; besides the district ,and county attorneys could not stand before one jury one day
and contend that he was sane .and the next day
stand before another jury and plead that he
was insane. The further argument that, if the jury
convicted him .and he was insane, they could get
a writ of habeas corpus and get him out of the·
penitentiary, was an appeal to the jury to disregard their oath and shift their responsibility
of determining whether he was insane at the time
of the commission of the offense."
See also W eige vs. State (Tex. 1917) 196 S.W. 524
where the following argument w.as held to be reversible
error:
"Gentlemen, you can go out and find this
defendant guilty of murder and send him to the
penitentiary, and the law is, if you send him to
the p·enitentiary, he and his folks can call for
a trial charging him with lunacy in the county
court, and put him in the asylum if the jury
find he was insane, because you cannot put an
insane man in the penitentiary; but if you should
turn him loose, how do you know he will ever
be tried for. insanity, :and he might go back up
where he live.s and do the same thing over again,
or kill his children."
In Estepp vs. Commonwealth 185 Ky. 156, 214 S.W.
891 it was declared highly improper for a prosecuting
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attorney to go outside the record in an attempt to influence the jury by stating that unle~ss the maximun1
penalty was inflicted defendant might escape sentence
in part by being parolled. In State vs. Little, 228 N.C.
417, 45 S.E. ( 2) 542 it was held th,at the solicitor's
statement to the jury that if defendant were convicted
there would he an app.eal and in event the decision of
the lower court should be affirmed there would he an
ap·p~eal to the governor to commute the sentence and that
no more than 60% of prisoners convicted of capital
offenses were ever executed constituted reversible error
as relating to matters not included in ·evidence. See
also Smith vs. State (Tex. 1909) 117 S.\\T. 966.
Whether the court's error in refusing to correct the
misstatement of the district attorney was p;:rejudicial
depends on whether it likely affected the jury's deliber.ations. In this connection we call attention to the facts.
Here is a defendant who because of a se\ere mental
illness has killed two people "ithout motive, without
remorse and without conscience. Because of his mental
condition it is likelY that if freed he would again commit
an anti-social act. This is particularly true unle.ss he
undergoes treatn1ent for his condition "\Yhich Dr. Nelson
described as inpatient treat1nent consisting of the slow
process of relearning oyer a period of years, sonlewhat as a ehild is taught fron1 infancy to 1naturity
(R. 1()-l-). No jury is going to conte1nplate "\Yith favor
turning a erilninally insane person loose under such
eiren1ustane-Ps. They nnquestionabl~~ "\Vould have an entirely different attitude about a verdict of not guilty
•

L
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by reason of insanity which would result in a further
hearing and a fair determination by the court of defendant's mental illness ,and likelihood of injuring somebody. With that assurance they could consider the question of defendant's legal sanity solely on its merit. The
refusal of the court 'to clarify the law concerning this
matter placed defense counsel in the anomalous position
where added proof of mental illness would diminish
rather than increase their chance of a not guilty verdict.
The more severe defendant's mental illness the more
abhorent the thought of turning him loose. The jury
unquestionably believed the District Attorney when he
told them that a verdict of guilty would be the only
obstacle to defendant's freedom. They believed him because of hi.s position as a public servant. They believed
him because the court, although urged to correct his
misstatement of the lavv, refused to do so, and by its
silence lent tacit approval to what he had said. (See
the exception taken by defense counsel to refusal of
the trial court to give its requested instruction No. 3
at Record 240, 241.) Believing that the only way to avoid
turning defendant loose was to find him guilty they
found him guilty. The probability i.s that the defense of
insanity was never even considered by the jury. Their
concern was for the future of society and they believed
themselves to be the sole and only obstacle in the path
of defendant's freedom. This could be the only possible
rationale for the cruel and inhuman verdict which did
not recommend leniency for an eighteen year old youth
concededly suffering from a severe mental illness.
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CONCLUSION
It is our position that this court should grant defendant a new trial for two basic and important reasons.
First, the trial court by instructing the jury that defendant was legally sane if he knew that murder is against
the law, and by eliminating the requirement that defend~
ant understand the moral implications of his conduct
has redueed the defense of insanity to a sham. If a man
can be held morally accountable and subject to punishment for an act which he does not comprehend and
understand to be morally wrong, then our great progress of recent_ years toward an understanding of mental
illness in all of its various forms has been confined
to the medical profession and has utterly escaped the
learned profession of the law.
The second proposition involves basic concepts of
fairness and justice. We appreciate the fact that when
two people have innocently n1et death at the hands of
another, society as a ·w. hole becomes inflamed and biased
to a certain degree against the perpetrator of that offense. This is true regardless of ''l1ether or not the
defendant is mentally responsible for his acts. Therefore
it is of uttnost importance that the trial oourt be vigilant
in guarding agains1t any appeal to passion on the part
of the prosecuting attorney. Here a duly elected officer
of the })('OJ)h:• advised the jury that a. verdict of not
guilty hy rea8on of insanity would turn defendant loose.
This statetnent "\v·as absolutely erroneous and it cast
before the jury· the gr.ueson1e prospect, if they found
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defendant not guilty, of turning loose a criminally insane
person on society. The mere denial of such fact by defense oounsel eould not eliminate the prejudice:. The only
possibility of restoring the jury to a rational consideration of the insanity issue was for the trial court to
give a cautionary ins~truction setting the record straight
as to the manner in which defendant's future would be
determined if he were found not guilty by reason of
in.sanity. When the court refused to give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 3 it was only to be expected
that the jury would consider their duty to society paramount to their duty to defendant and would find him
guilty, and they would do ·so irrespective of whether
they believed his warped and distorted mind was capable of comprehending the moral wrong that he had committed.
It is our further hope that this honorable court will
meet the challenge pre.sented by our ever broadening
knowledge of defects and diseases of the mind, and will
review in its entirety our present legal standards for
determining sanity. It is a well known fact that McN.aghten's right and wrong test is obsolete and outmoded.
It is as outmoded as the so-called wild-bea.st test which
it superseded. See Rex vs. Arnold, 16 Howard State
Trials 695. This court would not be without p·recedent in
adopting such a course. The United States ~c·ourt of
Appeals, District of Columbi~a Circuit, ha.s pointed the
way in Durham vs. United States, 214 F. (2d) 862. The
Durham case recognizes the humanitarian precept that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

"our collective conscience does not allow punishment
where it cannot impose blame." Its criticism of the right
and wrong test is two-fold. First, it does not take sufficient account of p_sychic realities and scientific knowledge, and, second, it is based upon one symptom so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. The Durham
case adopts the enlightened rule that where there is
some evidence of mental disease or defect, in order to
convict, the jury must find either (1) that the accused
was not suffering from a mental defect or disease, or
(2) that even if he was, the criminal act was not the
p,roduct of that condition. In determining those issues
the jury is given the broad discretion of examining every
facet of the accused's mental condition, not just the
tiny compartment where his capability of understanding
right from wrong resides.
We re.spectfully subn1it that for the errors pointed
out in this brief defendant should be granted a new
trial, and that this eourt should go a step further and
adopt in substance the rule of the Du rlza1n case, supra,
for a ne"'" trial in this ease and for future use in the
State of 1Ttah.
Respectfully _subnritted,
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